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Post-colonial curricula in African Universities continue to dislocate the 
Africans under the school coated politics and infected benevolence of 
education. It remains the bearer of the Euro-American stamp which makes 
Africans the ‘natural’ followers of the stamp owners and define themselves 
in the language written over the stamp. The system teaches Africans to 
ignore the values of their languages which in turn pushes them to the 
periphery of knowledge production and true epistemic communication. It 
continued to teach them to hate themselves and to over-value ‘foreign ideas 
and values’ in the schools. TOFFEL and ILETS are remaining legitimate 
vehicles of the system and above all the litmus test for non English 
intelligence. African children, among others, continue to stay on the 
margins of real communication and knowledge production. The worst thing 
is, however, African intellectuals are contributing to this discriminating 
politics in schools and this is nothing short of self-denial of one’s own 
access to oneself in the epistemic space. In this paper, I will discuss how 
imposed languages undermine the Africans from the academic and 
epistemic points of view.  
Keywords: Knowledge production, politics, linguistic challenges, 
epistemic communication   
 
Introduction 
In this essay I discuss politics in schooling as a power driven linguistic 
superiority of the European academic position and its epistemological, 
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African education. The discussion goes beyond a sheer intention of 
bothering about ‘why the hitherto medium of education in most African 
countries remain in exoglossic or foreign languages to the philosophical 
analysis of the relics longstanding impact upon the Africans. I felt this 
worthy of rethinking since such a trend continued deflecting the Africans 
from the possibility of gaining comprehensive and hermeneutical self-
understanding. Since our historical encounter with Europe, we used to face 
challenges in which various generations of us, are simply remembered with 
much experience of daunting difficulties some at the conceptual levels and 
others, at the intellectual implementation and its utility.  
Here is a question central to my discussion; ‘why does Africa remain a 
hub of academic experimentation’ regardless of what the Africans have 
been longing for, viz. freedom in all aspects. I see ‘reason’ for this reviving 
behind a ‘veil of politics,’ when considered from historical and 
philosophical analysis, i.e. when I rethink of: the purpose of education, its 
origin, whom it stands for, how it is to be done, and so on. This takes me to 
politics in schooling which prevails through languages that promote 
conceptual superiority and exclusive interest of the language owners. 
Language for education means so many things for humankind so long as it 
involves production, definition, determination and dissemination of 
knowledge. Besides such foundational and epistemological functions, 
languages play axiological role in which we hardly deny them occupying 
centers of historical heritage as repository of the history of humanity. 
Unfortunately, the Africans have been deprived of this, throughout the 
history of post-colonial education, where we see school children learn to 
despise their past, ignore their present and look for their future baked by 
those who are teaching them from the exogenous experiences of life. This 
is largely due to the fact that their ‘thinking’ is done through colonial 
languages such as English. In most cases, English, which was initially a 
colonial language, continued surviving as a political language with which 
many scholarship granting institutions used to measure academic 
competence and excellence of non-English speakers. African scholars like 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o related this to colonial mentality that sees English, the 
language of imperialism as the only medium for intellectual and academic 
discourse. This hinders humanity from learning and sharing from and 
among each other. 
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The essay identifies politics in schooling with its polarization of 
humanity over the issue of education and its concealed ideological utilities 
in the schools. It argues that the Europeans created socio-linguistic based 
chain of ‘educational commands’ in which they continued pegging up to 
their super ordination to the Africans’ subordination. The trend reflects the 
Africans’ side as a ‘subordinate stance’ in which we constantly learn that 
the Africans are basically lacking something that the Europeans 
compensate for them by schooling. Cognizant of this, therefore, the essay 
calls for the need of African languages, not as alternatives, but rather as 
imperatives to liberate the youth from a linguistic colonial mindset. This is 
a soul searching endeavor that enables a kind of conceptual re-engineering 
so as to rescue the present self-despising and desperate youth in schools. 
The approach is emancipatory, at least from a philosophical point of view, 
since it awakens us from the desperate state of socio-linguistic dependency 
and scientific inferiority. The essay poses this as an imperative via which 
we overcome politics in schooling and our groundless hope in the 
epistemological validity and its practical utility coming from knowledge 
that we have known little. 
                                                                                          
Linguistic Challenge in African Education 
Before I venture into ‘politics in schooling as linguistic challenge and 
above all’ as a challenge to African philosophy, I want to explain the 
considerable role of languages in doing philosophy. P. Hountondji says 
thati, ‘Philosophy’ requires special conceptual ability on the part of the 
practitioner, i.e. terminologies, vocabularies and conceptual apparatus 
bequeathed by philosophical, tradition which one can never do without but 
must, on the contrary use with profit if we want to be authentic 
philosophers (Hountondji 1996: 74). Thus Philosophical communication of 
knowledge in general and producing this knowledge in particular, would 
inevitably lead us to a daunting task as long as it basically involves 
conceptual difficulties which are hardly possible without reasonable 
language ability. If we consider ‘philosophizing’ from this point of view, 
we may understand that languages in philosophizingii go beyond the daily 
languages we often use for communication, which is barely enough to 
discuss the ‘restriction’ I’m focusing on. Firstly, the nature of human 
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knowledge, contents and extents are all determined by our ability in the 
languages. Language, in this regard, helps individuals not only to deliver 
ideas but also to deliver mental contents inherent in realities queued up 
behind the practitioner’s life dialogueiii. I think H. G. Gadamer has already 
put this point in saying that “No one will deny that our language influences 
our thought. We think with words. To think is to think something with 
oneself; and to think something with oneself is to say something to oneself” 
(2004: 547). Here comes the point that I want to underline, i.e. doing 
philosophy, in this context, is a critical, rational, analytical and conceptual 
practice without which one’s own mental contents remain deaf to the self. 
This point underlines philosophizing, not only as a process of 
communicating knowledge but also a critical reflection on production of 
knowledge, producing knowledge itself, without imposed conceptual and 
linguistic rules. Indicating that Knowledge is the spiritual assimilation of 
reality essential to practical activities, as  Cornforth argued, theories and 
concepts are created in the process of such assimilation, which has creative 
aims, actively reflects the phenomena, properties, and laws of the objective 
world and has its real existence on the form of linguistic system (Cornforth 
1974: 208). Initially, this was emphasized by the exponents of logical 
positivism right from their premise that even scientific knowledge can be 
interpreted only by the linguistic means of formal logic or by reduction to 
the language of observation (Cornforth 1974: 207). One’s failure to 
recognize this due to a forced way of thinking would in turn let him/her 
trap himself/herself in others’ conceptual spaces.  
Coming back to the issue of linguistic challenges, therefore, it needs to 
be discussed from the understanding that doing philosophy indicates a 
point of departure from the view of the practitioner, which I think enables 
the practitioner discern his/her own conceptual take off. Here by conceptual 
take off I mean a kind of linguistic approach towards things/situations in 
focus in one’s own right guided by his/her inner conception. Originally, 
such a linguistic approach is our essential and social concern from which I 
think personalities like Rousseau put that it is as soon as one man was 
recognized by another as sentient, thinking being similar to himself, the 
desire one needs to communicate his feelings and thought made him seek 
the means to do so (in Eze 1997: 109). Accordingly, here I want to say that 
linguistic challenge refers to a situation in which one is deprived of basic 
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linguistic access through which he/she communicates with all the possible 
realities around. It is also a conceptual encirclement which causes 
philosophical restriction. But the question I want to address is; how is this 
issue connected to politics? 
 The above question takes us to the history of African philosophy, 
particularly in the postcolonial era, in which we often see that African 
philosophers are limited to borrowing selected concepts and re-appropriate 
them in searching for their own realities. At this stage, for instance, heavy 
metaphysical concepts such as space and time would remain conceptually 
impossible for those who are linguistically restricted and conceptually 
dislocated. Thus, linguistic denial in schooling is a politics which causes 
professional alienation and self-annihilation of intellectuals. Ali Mazrui, 
who underlined the idea that intellectual and scientific dependency in 
Africa is inseparable from linguistic dependency, wrote as follows: 
 
It is because of this that the concept of an African physicist who is not also 
westernized, modern surgeon who does not speak a European language, 
modern chemist, zoologist and economist is for the time-being a socio-
linguistic impossibility. This need not apply to a Chinese or Japanese 
physicist, where it is possible to engage in a scientific conversation at a 
sophisticated level without the explicit mediation of a foreign language 
(Mazrui 2003: 10). 
 
Given these, therefore, I would like to say that linguistic challenge in the 
present curricula is a main symptom of the politics in schooling. For one 
thing, this politics hides itself in the curricula and formalized itself through 
policies. It is a kind of the politics of assimilation which now continues to 
be observed among Africans who have good command of European 
languages. Thus, letting the external influence to the extent that it denies 
the others having access to themselves in the schools is politics. It is a 
politics which makes the others focus on imitating the external model of 
thinking and award the best imitators. It has been throughout such a model 
that the African intellectuals have been denied of what others called 
linguistic disquotationaliv statements. Accordingly, it would be an obvious 
denial if it deprives others of the right to put the fact that’ fire burns’ 
without quoting somebody or thinking in accordance with others’ linguistic 
implications. Wiredu indicated this when he said that African philosophers 
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think philosophically in English or French or German or Portuguese or 
some such languages (Bell 2002: 19).Thus, given such conditions, the only 
thing (if any) that the African intellectual is doing is that he/she thinks in 
her/his own language and creates/philosophizes through the conceptual 
scheme of others which I think unduly distorts creativity and 
philosophizing. In this case, however, what is forced to be adjusted to the 
others’ life style and mode of knowledge production is not only the African 
ways of thinking, but also the whole philosophy that one engages in. The 
present European pervasive campaigns to educate and feed us encourage 
this act of displacement. Accordingly, the Euro-American curricula given 
to the Africans are not pure academic in their purpose. Secondly, as Robert 
Phillipson put it, postcolonial educational systems, particularly due to the 
influence of the World Bank in recent decades, have tended to give priority 
to the former colonial languages and a marginal status to the local 
languages (Ricento 2006: 349). Thus, Europeans legitimized and 
standardized their authority first in language. This is clearly linked with 
political authority which lets us remain their conceptual, political and 
socio-cultural victims.  
Furthermore, the politics in schooling has so many things to do with 
the very ambivalent claim that written language would be valued more 
highly than spoken languages. In his Of Grammatology, J. Derrida has 
worked out that the opposition between oral and written languages belongs 
to the European way of thinking (Kimmerle 1991: 44). Although they even 
claim that their preferred written languages are more valued, they equally 
know that writing in those languages simply speaks about their own 
realities. This attests to the system’s political aspect. Thus throughout such 
a system, the restricted segment of humanity continues to be disadvantaged 
while imitating the center being at the periphery. And whatever does this 
discrimination to some segments of humanity is politics no matter what and 
how we name it in the curricula. Because, language users (as Ricento said) 
have a conception of language and language use; conception of quality, 
value, status, norms, functions, ownership and so forth (2006: 241).  I think 
that it has been from such a consideration that some scholars clearly argue 
that linguistic assimilation of societies  into that of another group threatens 
its collective existence, since 'language is truly the archive and synthesis of 
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human group's main historical experiences that have gradually been 
deposited in and incorporated into its vocabulary and structure'v. 
 The sad thing in the politics of schooling is, however, that the West is 
systematically continuing the project in various systematic and ambivalent 
ways. The continuity can be understood from many socio-political 
conventions and various instrumental covenants in which they often use 
ambiguous, mischievous and ambivalent concepts. In her piece on 
“Language and Human Rights”, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas underlined one of 
those critical (inherent) human affairs which The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) fails to recognizevi in its paragraph on education 
(article 26) (Ricento 2006: 74). 
Besides, in the postcolonial era, the systematic continuity of this 
legacy replicates itself in views of the exponents of contemporary 
European philosophy in general and continental philosophy in particular. It 
is a paradox that we are forced to learn from selected texts and in their 
languages yet their philosophy (that is continental philosophy for instance) 
remains a clear designation found exclusively in English speaking countries 
(Eze 1997: 184). As we are forced to choose what is not our choice, we 
learn to restrict ourselves to their few texts, sources and individual thinkers 
even to deal with ‘African philosophy’ courses. Okot p’Bitek wrote “Our 
universities and schools are nests in which black exploiters are hatched and 
bred, at the expense of the taxpayers, or perhaps heart payers” (Okot 
p’Bitek 1967: 47). This insinuates that the Europeans tried a lot to produce 
Africans with such a mentality in their education. That is why I consider 
Euro-American linguistic policy to Africa as a mere historico-political and 
philosophic-conceptual restriction on African thinkers in general and 
education in particular. Perhaps, it is from such a conception, in the “the 
imperialismvii of English” (1997) that Van Dic noted that the language 
barrier has become a more general scholarly and cultural barrier… the main 
obstacle to linguistic diversity, also in scholarship, however, is the 
arrogance of linguistic power in Anglophone countries, and especially the 
USA (Quoted in Robert Phillipson 2003: 350). 
 The Original project of the politics in schooling is becoming a critical 
challenge to African philosophy from within. This has been largely 
transplanted by some African authors who unconsciously embraced the 
project. Accordingly, African philosophy of education which is initially 
displaced by the Europeans is now facing big challenges from the European 
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trained Africans. Historically, such an orientation goes back to the 
emergence of colonial mentality in many parts of Africa. In this regard, I 
think, it is good, just to look back to some of the historical indications 
through which such a mentality started to penetrate arguments of politics in 
schooling. Leopold S. Senghor once argued that: 
 
We express ourselves in French since French has a universal vocation and 
since our message is also addressed to French people and others. In our 
languages (i.e. African languages) the halo that surrounds the words is by 
nature merely that of sap and blood; French words send out of rays like 
diamond (quoted in Thiong’o 1981:19). 
 
In addition, to speak from my own experience; in denying the very concept 
of African philosophy, one of my philosophy professorsviii (in fact black 
like me) expressed the incompatibility of some languages in understanding 
the nature of ‘philosophy’ and to philosophize, i.e. in his expression: “It is 
impossible to do philosophy in languages such as Afaan Oromoo and 
Amharic since in them we cannot find metaphysical expressions like the ‘is 
of is’ix and ‘is of is not’ that we find in Greek language within concepts 
such as ousia”x. Here, I would like to earnestly show my readers to 
understand that my concept of linguistic challenge is not limited to such a 
mentality alone, but rather it goes to some ‘critical African thinkers’, who 
unfortunately fail to escape this influence and continue to do philosophy 
via the European system of doing thinking. Ngugi wa Thiongo indicated 
this problem in his discussion of the concept of “impact of politics on 
languages’. Here the point is, therefore, that most writers, who should have 
mapped paths out of the linguistic encirclement, came to define themselves 
in the limited context of languages of imperialists. Thus from these two 
mentalities, i.e. colonial mentalityxi and the one with slight modifications, I 
understand ‘linguistic challenge’ as some other thing more than ‘mere 
linguistic restriction’ so long as it determines the level of our self-
examination and knowledge production. Such a linguistic challenge ends in 
a conceptual limitation in which one loses his/her mental spaces by the 
exclusive model of thinking of others. It is, therefore, from this point that I 
continue to feel that African education is missing a basic thing without 
which knowledge production appears an impossible project.  
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Cognizant of the system’s long standing impact, some African scholars 
have been rethinking this and calling for mental decolonization. Among 
few, Ngugi wa Thiongo has repeatedly indicated the negative outcome of 
such foreign languages. In my understanding of Thiongo, the displaced and 
replaced African language has so many things to do with the post-colonial 
Africans’ mental occupations. In his book, “Decolonizing the Mind,” 
Thiongo argued that language is inseparable from us as a community of 
human beings within specific form and character, specific history, specific 
relationship to the world (Thiongo 1991: 16). In fact, in the light of 
Thiongo’s argumentxii, African languages are leading in revealing the 
African realities and respond to imperialistic prejudices. Thus, it would 
hardly be possible to think of genuine African philosophy of education in a 
situation where African languages are dislocated and replaced by other 
languages.  
Realizing this, I consider African languages as proper tools to deal 
with the African realities. For one thing, the absence of African languages 
has an unparalleled power to deflect the Africans from seeing realities of 
their life dialogue through which they would engage in meaningful 
relationshipsxiii with others. The one who is cut-off from his/her respective 
life dialogue would misunderstand his/ her life-dialogue and eventually be 
entangled by estrangements. The message delivered by Habermas’ concept 
of impoverishment of the life-world, for which he blamed people’s 
restrictions to particular expertise or specialists, has a similar tone with this 
argument. In Habermas’ view, it involves a conceptual game in life which 
lets a person lose twoxiv very important things. Such a person loses 
consensus and influence in his/her life which would not fail short of 
deprivation from being human. Although it did not benefit the Africans, 
post modernism has been focusing on the significance of this issue, i.e. it 
suggests significant concerns about language policy and planning which 
Penny Cook put as follows; 
 
First it raises important questions about how power operates in relation to the 
nation-state, and in particular how governance is achieved through language, 
second, it urges us to rethink the ontology of language as a colonial 
(modernist) construct, third, it raises questions about the grand narratives or 
sweeping epistemologies of imperialism, language rights, or language access, 
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and fourth, it points towards local, situated, contextual and contingent ways 
of understanding languages and language policies (quoted in Thomas Ricento 
2006: 64). 
 
However, in calling for the Africans’ rethinking of African languages, I 
would like to clearly indicate my intention that linguistic liberation itself is 
not enough to tell us what African philosophy of education is all about. 
Rather I am indicating that, knowledge production would hardly be 
possible without such a basic freedom. This has to be considered from the 
very concept of Philosophy in the process of knowledge production. 
Although the substance of knowledge does not lie in the vernacular, 
conditions of unfreedom like linguistic challenge unduly determine the 
content, scope, quality and originality of our education. I think, Wiredu was 
right, in saying that doing philosophy in your own language does not mean 
that you immediately become more insightful (Wiredu 2002). However, 
still this view does not undermine the fact that language is a critical and 
indispensable means via which human beings experience philosophical 
freedom and freely broaden the horizon of their mental spaces. Above all, 
since knowledge production involves formulation of conceptual apparatus 
and critical vocabularies, we need to have our proper means and 
conceptually free to provide possible translations and alternatives. 
Furthermore, if we understand and acknowledge the merit of cross-
cultural communication and possibility of transcultural understanding, we 
would first appreciate our benefit from linguistic reality as part and parcel 
of humanity at its cross road. However, this does not mean that linguistic 
freedom makes total understanding possible, but that it helps us to foster 
our conceptual environments in which we present alternatives without 
negating others. It might be for the same concern that Wiredu and 
Kaphagawani presented alternativesxv which focus on the examination of 
important epistemological concepts as it appears in two different 
languages. In addition, language related problems, in searching for 
complex veracities of humanity at crossroads goes beyond such a 
conceptual (terminological) confrontationxvi to some basic principles of 
languages. It would be wrong to impose specific principles of one language 
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upon other languages. George Berkeley, in his “Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge”, argued as follows; 
 
…the communicating of ideas… is not the chief and only end of language as 
it is commonly supposed. There are other ends as the rising of some passion, 
the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some 
particular disposition; to which the former (communicating ideas) is in many 
cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted when this can be 
obtained without it. As I think does not infrequently happen in the familiar 
use of language (quoted in Irving M. Copi and Karl Kohen 2005: 71).  
 
 Accordingly, restricting the language and rule of African philosophy of 
education to the European calculative reasoning clearly displaces realities 
of African life dialogue. It is, a pedagogical restriction which conceptually 
compelsxvii us to accept Western logic (Aristotelian formal logic), which for 
sure jeopardizes the essential meaning of philosophy in general and African 
philosophy in particular. This linguistic compulsion bears a message that 
African languages are insufficient to describe reality. I think, Wiredu 
disproved such a predilection in his study of the Akan language. He argued 
that in the Akan language we have no such statement form as ‘p’ if and 
only if ‘q’ and [if (p then q) and if q then p]’ and hence, this logical 
principle is not universal (quoted in P. H. Coetzee and P. J. Roux 2000: 
242). However, in contemporary African philosophy we are forcedxviii to 
take this principle in the logic course. I think this by itself is restriction and 
displacement as long as we consider it as an imperative while it should be 
seen as an option. Accordingly, as I have been discussing, Euro-American 
educational policy is a singular occidental model of dislocating the 
Africans in the world of knowledge production. T. G. Wiley put this 
singular and exclusive model as follows: 
 
The colonizer’s model has been particularly resilient over time as it pertains 
to Western notion of language and literacy. In its more recent manifestations, 
some historians and historical anthropologists have attempted to determine 
the cognitive and societal effects of literacy. Western standardized language 
of literacy provides the models for corpus and status planning or 
intellectualization (quoted in Ricento 2006: 144).     
   




Likewise, Rostow related this asymmetric relation to the very formulation 
of post colonial states in his conclusion that many of their prescribed 
models for language planning and policy formulation follow in the 
footsteps of successful Western nations and resemble universalistic models 
that assume a linear path to economic and national development (Rostow 
1960, quoted in Ricento 2006:188). If we consider this from Oruka’s 
conception of African philosophy, then the issue of linguistic bondage 
would clearly entail that African philosophy itself is in bondage because 
philosophy is not an activity done in vacuum but a response to social 
conditions, which I think, European projects forced us to ignore. Thus, in 
this case, I understand the European style of language planning as 
conceptual restrictions on the Africans since they systematically deny them 
access to the process of knowledge production. Focusing on the works of 
philosophers, who engage in comparative philosophical studies, G. Blocker 
recommended practitioners ; “If European, or European-trained scholars 
are the speakers or writers, then, at least at the beginningxix, they must use 
their language (with the standard meaning of words, terms and concepts) to 





Post-colonial African curricula denied Africans access to the process of 
knowledge production. This project has been bracketing the Africans from 
the epistemic space of indigenous knowledge production.  The project has 
been largely carried out through the linguistic displacement which 
challenges Africans in the process of education. Thus, right from the school 
children to the higher level intellectuals, Africans have been challenged to 
engage in genuine education through what basically they understand. 
Reversing this school politics needs ‘open-mindedness’ towards 
linguistic plurality and the existence of epistemic diversity. That is, if we 
accept that there is no one tradition and framework of thought alone which 
is adequate for knowledge production, then issues of language would be 
clear to be thought of in the same way. Here, I mean that in the world with 
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varieties of reasons and truths, we should understand and acknowledge 
possibilities of similar varieties of means of communication. Thus, the very 
existence of such varieties of reasons tells us that there is no one language 
that could be justified to be appropriate for a cross-cultural communication 
and transcultural understanding. In this regard I accept Peter Winch’s view 
on face value; i.e. seriously to understand another way of life is necessarily 
to extend our own (Bell 2002) and would like to recommend others in 
repeating the same assertion of Jasper, i.e. we must restore the readiness to 
think against the tendency to have everything prepared in advance and, as it 





 i Here I think Hountondji did not explicitly call for African native languages to do 
philosophy. However, (even in his rejection of ethno-philosophy) due to his 
conception that tribal thought cannot be a legitimate source of philosophy) he is 
not totally against such native languages but rather he wanted to place major 
qualification on their usefulness for philosophy (Richard Bell 2002: 5).  
 
ii Heavy and serious metaphysical concepts such as space and time would remain 
conceptually uncertain on the side of those who are linguistically restricted and 
conceptually dislocated. A person such as J. Mbiti would have kept himself from a 
dangerous conclusion about African concept of time had he considered the fact 
that concepts hide more than they reveal (for instance, the concept of dooms day 
in his argument). Hence, on my part, I believe that it is only through an 
unrestricted use of language that we may recall the past, understand the present 
and foresee the future.  
 
iii The very concept of ‘life dialogue’ indicates the necessity of one’s free 
conceptual, philosophical, metaphysical and spiritual engagement with human and 
non-human conceivable, memorable and predictable environment (see Doyo 
2011). Thus, linguistically life dialogue is a process of communicating and 
communicating with both human and non-human aspects of nature. 
   




iv Quoting Putnam (Theory of Disquotationality), Eze indicated that this concept 
holds that any true reference is reducible to a statement whose conditions meet 
assertability. It implies that one has a basis, and therefore, entitled, to assert 
something as true by learning the meaning of experience (Eze 2008: 119). 
Accordingly, in my discussion, I understand that African philosophers (in post 
colonial era) are forced to quote the Europeans even in statement like ‘snow is 
white’. 
 
v J. A. De Obieta-Chalbaud, 'Self-Determination of peoples as a Human Right', 
Plural Societies, XVI, 1 (1986), p. 63. 
 
vi Here she indicated that there are preferences to the full development of human 
personality and the right of parents to choose a kind of education that shall be 
given to their children, which however does not include the right to choose the 
language in which this education is given. 
 
vii Phillipson argued that the concept of linguistic imperialism resonates with the 
historical facts of empires as socio political structures have risen and fallen over 
three millennia, and with the analytical exploration of the role of language in the 
empires that dominated the world scene in recent centuries. Thus linguistic 
imperialism entails unequal exchange and unequal communicative right between 
people of all groups defined in terms of their competence in specific languages 
with unequal benefits. It is also a feature of colonial empires with a deeper degree 
of linguistic penetration among others (see Robert Phillipson in Thomas Ricento 
2006: 348). 
 
viii My professor is measuring African realities with the European biased gauge 
just like our European conquerors and those with colonial mentality in Africa used 
to do. Moreover, given a particular historic-politically, and socio-religiously 
‘situated life dialogue’, I encountered most people of my kind changing even their 
names to the language of religiously dominant and politically hegemonic system, 
that I came to consider as unconscious legacy of colonial mentality entrenched in 
us.  
 
ix I think this by itself may not be equivalent to the Greek expression that my 
professor used, i.e. to ti en einai (perhaps, to mean the this being a being).I think 
one can analyze the African concept ‘Ubuntu’ in the same metaphysical way, i.e. 
questioning why Ub- (the prefix) evokes the idea of being in general in its 




orientation towards untu? Or muntu, which I think, the English language may not 
exhaust its metaphysical meaning. 
 
x  It is a Greek concept. I think various languages may have their own equivalent 
concepts from which we may understand that my professor’s claim holds no 
water. 
 
xi According to Wiredu, this is a mentality which makes a formerly colonized 
person over-value “foreign things” coming from his erstwhile colonial master. He 
indicated that “things”, here is to be interpreted widely to include not only 
material objects but also modes of thought and behavior. Wiredu considers this as 
a psychological penetration of colonialism. This mentality induced our people 
during colonial time (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992:62). 
 
xii The choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to 
people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social 
environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe. Hence language has always 
been at the heart of the two contending social forces in the Africa of the 20th 
century (Thiong’o 1981: 4). 
 
xiii Without this relationship, I strongly believe that reasonable contribution is 
hardly possible. That is why personalities such as Alan Woods and Ted Grant 
argued that only through language is it possible to establish a really human form 
of communication with others, to share one’s “inner life” with them (see, Alan 
and Grant: 305).I consider any communications which ignore such an inner life as 
superfluous and philosophically devoid of genuine veracities lie with a particular 
life dialogue. Thus, it would be a colossal leap for Africans to give a considerable 
attention to African languages in order to engage in philosophical activities as a 
soul searching endeavor. 
 
xiv These are consensus and influence. Consensus and influence are, in this context 
Habermas’ concepts through which he talked about ‘verstaendigung’. This 
concept is loosely translated as or refers to linguistic understanding and to the 
process of reaching the agreement. He referred to such a use of language as the 
use of language oriented towards consensus (C. Maev 1994: 9).  
 
   




xv Wiredu and Kaphagawani proposed this during their discussion on the old-
existing problem of generality versus specificity. Here, the point is truth and 
meaning must be seen as  relative intentionality opinion or point of views so as 
every originally offering view is legitimate source of knowledge (Masolo 1995: 
208). 
 
xvi This is worth attention, even appropriate response to Mbiti’s denial of African 
concept of future time; Wiredu indicated that, if a concept is incoherent with a 
given language, it does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with it, 
for it may be that the language in question is expressively inadequate (Wiredu 
1996: 313). And hence I consider it as Mbiti used the European concept ‘dooms 
day’ in searching for equivalent concept in Africa, but mistakenly concluded that 
something (the future) is absent in Africans’ notion of time.  
 
xvii It is at this point, that, I came up with my own conception that our academic 
policy and curricula is simply a reaffirmation of Levy Bruhl’s prejudice that 
characterizes the Africans with prelogical mind, which he described as 
‘unscientific, uncritical and contains evident contradiction’. 
 
xviii Here I am speaking from my experience in which we have been academically 
and conceptually compelled to accept European logic, language and conceptual 
framework.  
 
xix Likewise, Blocker argues that if Indian or Chinese intellectuals had begun 
discussion, talking and writing about European thought traditions, exactly the 
same principle would apply – the Indians and Chinese would use their own 
languages, with their concepts, in to which they would try as best they could fit 
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